







Abstract. This paper presents the 
contribution of corporate gover-
nance to the risk management 
system of an enterprise from the 
perspective of the financial 
leverage. We assume that compa-
nies with a strong corporate 
governance framework are likely 
to enhance the optimality of their 
financial structure. 
We perform a literature overview 
on this topic, in parallel with an 
empirical approach that brings 
forth the effect of corporate 
governance framework on the 
company financial structure, with 
a special focus on leverage. 
The empirical approach is 
developed using the Ordinary 
Least Squares methodology; the 
results of the research reflect a 
strong impact of corporate gover-
nance on the company financial 
structure. 
We construct this finding from the 
perspective of the beneficial effects 
of an enhanced corporate gover-
nance framework which reduces 
agency costs, conferring to the 
company more credibility in the 
eyes of creditors. 
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Financial risk management has become more and more important during the 
last fifteen years. Globalization triggered capital market development and meanwhile 
the increase of the volatility which generated a high degree of incertitude at the level 
of the corporate segment. 
Capital structure and financial performance of companies are impacted to a 
high extent by the volatility peculiar to global financial markets, generating the 
development of the financial management which focuses on the main variables 
representing the source of risk – interest rate, foreign exchange, equity and 
commodity. 
Analysts have been preoccupied with identifying potential correlations 
between company’ value and financial management, especially from the perspective 
of scale economies. Implementing financial management departments create incentive 
to economic growth since risk mitigation techniques support wealth accumulation. 
This relationship represented the research object of studies concentrated 
especially on non-financial firms since financial institutions imply peculiarities in 
terms of capital structure. 
There are various theories on the contribution of risk management to 
shareholders’ value creation. Nevertheless, imperfections of capital market – agency 
costs, transaction costs, taxes, and increasing costs of external financing – represent 
the layer by which company value may increase to benefit of the shareholders.  
Risk management tools represent the support to company’ value maximization 
and it becomes essential in the context of capital market integration. Risk increase 
complemented by risk concentration may confer vulnerability to corporate segment. 
Therefore, risk management strategies contribute in an essential manner to value 
creation. 
By definition, risk is related to uncertainties associated with returns from an 
investment. These uncertainties would translate into volatility or the fluctuation of the 
expected returns from an investment. 
By analogy with corporate segment, risk derives from the fluctuations 
triggered by the modifications of various external and internal factors. These 
fluctuations are recorded especially at the level of the profitability indicators as well as 
at the level of capital structure ratios, reflecting the manner in which an aggregate 
assembly of factors can impose the volatility of company’ financial performance. 
This paper is concentrated on the relationship between financial management 
and corporate governance from the perspective of the capital structure. We consider 
financial leverage as a key component of capital structure and we analyze the impact 
of various financial indicators on the company’s ability to attract external financial 
resources in conjunction with some peculiarities of the company corporate governance 
framework.  The relation between financial management and corporate governance 
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Thus, besides the firm related variables, we insert into the models some 
variables that reflect the key features of the corporate governance standards that the 
company have implemented. 
The mixture between firm related and corporate governance related variables 
reflect the interference between corporate governance and financial management, in 
deeply connection with the risk management strategies. 
This research continues as follows: in the next section we effect a literature 
review on the correlation between capital structure and corporate governance while in 
the third section we develop an empirical approach using the Ordinary Least Squares 
methodology. The results delivered by the econometric application are analyzed and 
construed in comparison with related studies. 
The last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Company financial structure can be perceived as a receptor of various systems 
of factors deriving out of the firm and industry level, institutional, legal, political and 
social framework (Gietzmann and Ireland (2005)). 
Apart of these factors, capital structure bears the mark of the board of 
directors’ decision in respect of the company’s financing policy, being deeply linked 
with the corporate governance area.  
In line with this idea, previous studies highlighted the impact of corporate 
governance on capital structure (Hart, 1995, Fosberg, 2004, Anderson et al., 2007). 
This influence proved to be a strong one especially in the case of exchange traded 
firms as well as in the case of companies of large size. Most of the researches 
suggested that board size and structure, CEO duality and CEO compensation and 
tenure are the key variables of corporate governance.  
In line with these findings, Berger et al. (1997) uncovered that companies with 
a large board have low leverage; this was due to the fact that large board is likely to 
impose managers to lower the company’ indebtedness in order to increase its 
profitability. 
Subsequent studies (Wen et al., 2002, Abor, 2007) revealed opposite findings, 
meaning that large boards encourage leverage and this results in a strict oversight 
exerted on the company’ managers’; the latter revert to higher leverage as they pursue 
the policy of a positive correlation between debt and profitability.  
Anderson et al. (2004) highlighted that is cheaper for companies with a large 
board to attract external financial resources since creditors perceive these companies 
as having a rigorous monitoring of the financing decision.  
Wen et al. (2002) identified a negative relationship between number of outside 
directors on the board and leverage. The authors assumed that outside directors have 
the incentive to monitor managers very strictly, determining them to adopt a lower 
leverage in order to encourage a high market value of equity. Management & Marketing 
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The CEO duality influences the capital structure of the company (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983, Fosberg, 2004). Literature revealed the importance of the two-tier 
leadership (the impossibility for the same person to be simultaneously in the position 
of the board of directors’ chair and CEO). Not permitting both decision management 
and decision control authority to be exerted in common, this contributes to the 
mitigation of the agency costs. Fosberg (2004) argued that firms which do not promote 
CEO duality are more likely to adopt an optimal capital structure, with a convenient 
weight of debt in the financial mixture. Moreover, Anderson et al. (2004) argued that a 
dual leadership violates the balance of power and authority, affecting the clear 
division of responsibilities at the head of the company. Shamsul (2004) set forth that 
the effectiveness of the board role diminishes in case of dual leadership since one 
person is entitled to manage both the operations (as a CEO) and the internal 
controlling (as a board chairman). 
Another key variable of corporate governance that is likely to be correlated 
with capital structure consists of the CEO compensation scheme and tenure. 
Literature revealed contradictory results in terms of the correlation between 
CEO compensation and financial leverage. Stulz (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), 
Abor and Biekpe (2008) highlighted that companies which promote fixed 
compensation schemes for CEO adopt a lower leverage in order to diminish the 
financial risk while Wen et al. (2002) brought forth a negative relationship. 
As for the CEO tenure, authors emphasized that CEO with a long tenure 
prefer low leverage due to their objective to reduce potential pressures of the 
shareholders in order to obtain a certain level of profitability. This aspect is 
determined by the fact that shareholders usually perceive a higher debt with a 
commensurate risk level, requiring an equivalent reward, which gives incentive to 
significant pressures exerted upon CEO.  
 
3. Database and methodology 
 
In an attempt to enlarge the existing literature on this topic, this study deals 
with the correlation between capital structure peculiarities and corporate governance. 
We follow the approach developed by Jaggi and Low (2000), Hail (2002) or Yu 
(2005), integrating in various equations variables enclosing the key features of capital 
structure and corporate governance system.  
What it differentiates our study is precisely the focus on a more complex 
system of financial indicators, consisting of a wide range of variables that reflect both 
the manner in which external and internal financial resources mix in the capital 
structure of the company, as well as its tangibility; the latter indicator underlines the 
autonomy of the enterprise, deeply anchored in the corporate governance field.  
In the credit analysis area, the tangible net worth serves as a proof for the 
company financial independency, determining its indebtedness degree and the 
tailoring of the risk management strategies.  The relation between financial management and corporate governance 
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Moreover, in case of a potential failure, the tangible net worth represents the 
basis upon which creditors manage to recover the lending they granted to the 
companies. 
We consider the financial autonomy of the company to be related with the 
concept of corporate governance; in fact, tangible net worth reflects the overall policy 
adopted by the board of directors, with important implications on the overall activity 
of the company. 
As for the corporate governance area, we use a part of the classic key 
variables that were valorized by similar studies (Hail (2002), Yu (2005)), such as 
board size, board meeting and dual leadership, but we also enlarge the set of variables 
relating to corporate governance by the CEO tenure and board management 
capabilities. 
To analyze the correlation between capital structure and corporate governance, 
we elaborate the following equations using the OLS methodology: 
i i MCAP B DIM B L D LEV FIN ε β β β α + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + = _ _ _ _ 3 2 1  (1) 
i i DIM B L D TEN M TD TAN ε β β β α + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + = _ _ _ / 3 2 1       (2) 
i i COMP B TEN M MCAP D T ε β β β α + ∗ + ∗ + ∗ + = _ _ _ 3 2 1        (3) 
where: 
Fin_Levi = Total Debt/Equity; 
D_L = Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the positions of board of 
directors’ chair and CEO are held by the same person and 0 otherwise; 
B_DIM = The board size of the company; 
B_MCAP = The number of board members with professional qualifications; 
M_TEN = The time-period during which the CEO holds that position; 
B_COMP = The number of outside directors divided by the total number of 
directors; 
T_D = Total Debt/Total Assets. 
We collect the corresponding financial information on 150 companies covered 
by the FTSE index. The main industries where the analyzed companies activate are: 
i) manufacturing (75 companies); ii) trade (30 companies); iii) transport (20 
companies) and; iv) food industry (25 companies). We eliminate firms activating in 
utility and banking field because of the peculiarities implied by their capital structure. 
The companies are characterized by a turnover of USD 100 mil. – 800 mil. per year, a 
number of approximative 70.000 – 130.000 employees and an age of about 10-25 
years.  
We collect financial information relative to these companies on a time-period 
of ten years (1998-2008). The companies included in our sample are located in USA, 
France, Italy, German, Spain, Belgium and Denmark. 
This study tests the below hypothesis: 
H0: There is no relationship between capital structure and corporate 
governance key variables; Management & Marketing 
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H1: There is a relationship between capital structure and corporate governance 
key variables. 
After applying the correlation matrix, we identified the lack of 
multicollinearity of the variables. 
 
4. Results and discussions 
 
The statistic output enclosed in table no.1 permits us to reject the null 
hypothesis which denies the existence of a relationship between financial indicators 
reflecting company’ capital structure and corporate governance.  
The first equation highlights a strong effect of dual leadership and 
management capabilities on financial leverage while the board dimension does not 
exert any influence. 
The positive influence of dual leadership on financial gearing is in line with 
the findings of Fosberg (2004) and Anderson et al. (2007) who revealed that CEO 
duality encourages the adoption of an aggressive financial leverage. This can be 
interpreted by the fact that a double position held by the same person (chair of board 
of directors and CEO) creates the incentive for a precise perspective on the financial 
standing of the company, encouraging the contraction of external debt. Moreover, 
double leadership implies more responsibilities and consequently the greed for 
additional compensation that may be obtained if the company becomes more 
profitable. The increase of the profitability may occur in the context of a positive 
effect of financial leverage. 
The positive effect of management capabilities on financial leverage is 
explained by the managers’ expertise that gives them the incentive to increase the 
company’s indebtedness on the condition of a proper risk management strategy of the 
company; a manager with a certain qualification is in the position to benefit from the 
positive effect of financial leverage. 
The second equation integrates the board dimension and management tenure 
as factors that impact the tangible net worth. While board dimension is irrelevant in 
case of financial leverage, its effect on the tangible net worth is positive. 
The management tenure may contribute to the tangible net worth from the 
perspective of its expertise accumulated over time that may lead to a sustained 
investment policy and consequently to the build up of a significant tangible net worth. 
The longer the period that a manager holds a position in a company, the more he is 
preoccupied with the developing of investment plans.  
The management tenure acts as a positive factor for the indebtedness degree in 
the third equation as well. We can appreciate that a longer experience of a manager in 
a company supports him to have a solid perspective on the enterprise financial 
standing, enabling him to take on important debt level. 
As in the case of the second equation where management capabilities 
encourage financial leverage, in the third one, the same explanatory variable acts in a 
similar manner in relation with the weight of total debt in total assets.  The relation between financial management and corporate governance 
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The board composition is not relevant for the company debt policy, in line 
with the findings of Berger et al. (1997). Previous researches underlined that corporate 
governance is more effective when the board is restrained since it is in the position to 
perform duly the oversight of the company and consequently the control of financial 
leverage (Jensen (1986), Lipton and Lorsch (1992)). Abor (2007) highlighted that 
larger boards adopt low debt policy.  
Berger et al. (1997) argued that managers have incentives to adopt a lower 
leverage in order to increase their equity base, especially in the case of large 
companies. More over, smaller boards increase the accountability of directors, 
rendering them responsible for the financing decisions. 
In conclusion, this section approached the relationship between corporate 
governance and capital structure from the perspective of the influences that key 
variables of corporate governance may exert on financial indicators that reflect the key 
features of capital structure. The statistic output permitted us to reject the null 
hypothesis that denied a potential relationship between capital structure and corporate 
governance, revealing that management capabilities or management tenure may have 
an impact on the company indebtedness degree or on the company tangible net worth. 
Thus, corporate governance system may act as an additional factor in respect 
of capital structure, adding to the series of classic factors such as firm, industry or 
country level characteristics, institutional, legal, political and social framework. 
 
Table 1 
Statistic output corresponding to the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial management 
                              Equation 
Indicator  Equation I  Equation II  Equation III 
Financial leverage  Dependent 
variable    
Tangible Net Worth/Total Debt    Dependent 
variable   
Total  Debt/Total  Assets    Dependent  variable 
Dual Leadership  1.226** (1.22) 
0.0011 
1.116 (0.031) 
0.001   






Management Capabilities  1.552** (1.117) 
0.139 








Board Composition      2.104 (0.551) 0.020 
Adjusted R-squared  0.445 0.521 0.551 
 
Source: own computations. 





This paper presents the contribution of corporate governance to the risk 
management system of an enterprise from the perspective of the financial leverage. 
We assume that companies with a strong corporate governance framework are likely 
to enhance the optimality of their financial structure. 
We perform a literature overview on this topic, in parallel with an empirical 
approach that brings forth the effect of corporate governance framework on the 
company financial structure, with a special focus on leverage. 
The empirical approach is developed using the Ordinary Least Squares 
methodology; the results of the research reflect a strong impact of corporate 
governance on the company financial structure. 
The first equation highlights a strong effect of dual leadership and 
management capabilities on financial leverage while the board dimension does not 
exert any influence. 
This can be interpreted by the fact that a double position held by the same 
person (chair of board of directors and CEO) creates the incentive for a precise 
perspective on the financial standing of the company, encouraging the contraction of 
external debt. 
The second equation integrates the board dimension and management tenure 
as factors that impact the tangible net worth. While board dimension is irrelevant in 
case of financial leverage, its effect on the tangible net worth is positive. 
The management tenure may contribute to the tangible net worth from the 
perspective of its expertise accumulated over time that may lead to a sustained 
investment policy and consequently to the build up of a significant tangible net worth. 
The management tenure acts as a positive factor for the indebtedness degree in 
the third equation as well. We can appreciate that a longer experience of a manager in 
a company supports him to have a solid perspective on the enterprise financial 
standing, enabling him to take on important debt level. 
As in the case of the second equation where management capabilities 
encourage financial leverage, in the third one, the same explanatory variable acts in a 
similar manner in relation with the weight of total debt in total assets. 
Based on the statistic output, we reveal that corporate governance system may 
act as an additional factor in respect of capital structure, adding to the series of classic 
factors such as firm, industry or country level characteristics, institutional, legal, 
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